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I. INTRODUCTION
The right to privacy in one's own body is a well-established principle
protected by the Constitution.2 Implied in this right is the notion that
decisions affecting a body should belong solely to the person whose body is
affected. As such, it is almost unimaginable for courts, rather than
individuals, to retain the power to dictate what people can and cannot do
with their bodies. Envision, for instance, a court requiring a child diagnosed
with Attention Deficit Disorder to take Ritalin before attending school.3 The
court's rationale justifying such action would be that the child would
otherwise be incompetent to attend school. This situation seems inherently
unfair: should courts be allowed to take away a person's right to make
autonomous decisions about the body?
2. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-84 (1965) (holding that the right to privacy
is protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of thought, the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process).
3. Ritalin is a drug commonly used to treat Attention Deficit Disorder. See View Our Products:
Ritalin Hydrochloride, available at http://www.pharma.us.novartis.com/products/name/ritalin.jsp
(last visited Feb 3, 2005).
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Recently, in Sell v. United States,4 the Supreme Court upheld the notion
that a court can order individuals to be medicated against their will.5 Despite
the fact that Sell involved a criminal defendant rather than a child, and
antipsychotic drugs rather than Ritalin, the scenario in Sell is not entirely
unlike the fictional scenario mentioned above.6 Sell, a former dentist with
an established and documented history of mental illness, was charged with
fraud in 1997. 7 Initially, despite his illness, the magistrate judge declared
Sell competent to stand trial, but the judge later reversed this decision. 8
Once ruled incompetent, Sell was hospitalized for treatment.9 Subsequently,
the hospital staff concluded that Sell would benefit from the use of
antipsychotic drugs, as such medication would likely render him competent
to stand trial.' 0 When Sell refused to take the drugs, the hospital staff sought
the district court's permission to forcibly administer the medication." The
magistrate issued an order to forcibly medicate Sell, and the district court
and court of appeals affirmed the order."t Considering Sell's case on appeal,
the Supreme Court determined that the Constitution permitted involuntary
medication of a mentally ill defendant to restore the individual's
competence, so that a state would then be able to try the accused. However,
these situations are limited to cases in which a four-factor test is met.
13
4. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
5. Id. at 169.
6. Id. at 169-71.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 170-71.
9. Id. at 171
10. Id. There is much controversy surrounding the drugs typically used to treat mental illnesses.
These pharmaceuticals are a class of medications called antipsychotics that fall under the general
category of psychotropic drugs. David M. Siegel, et. al., Old Law Meets New Medicine: Revisiting
Involuntary Psychotropic Medication of the Criminal Defendant, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 307, 345 (2001)
(discussing that, aside from antipsychotics, the category of psychotropics includes sedatives,
tranquilizers, hypnotics, mood stabilizers, and antidepressants). Although often beneficial, treatment
using antipsychotic medication varies by patient, but the drugs carry the risk of serious side effects,
some of which can even prove fatal. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 229-30 (1990). Some of
the more serious side effects may include acute dystonia (severe involuntary spasms of the upper
body, tongue or eyes), akathesia (motor restlessness often accompanied by an inability to sit still),
neuroleptic malignant syndrome (a less common disorder that may be fatal as a result of cardiac
dysfunction), and tardive dyskinesia (a condition characterized by involuntary movement of
muscles, usually in the face). Id. Other effects of antipsychotic drugs are impairment of a patient's
ability to remember, to relate effectively with others, to learn, and to reason. Michelle K. Bachand,
Note, Antipsychotic Drugs and the Incompetent and Prosecution of Incompetent Defendants, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1059, 1077 (1990). Finally, antipsychotics may have other effects such as
increased lethargy, dry mouth and throat, stuffy nose, blurred vision and urinary retention. Id. at
1063; Harper, 494 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171.
12. Id. at 174.
13. See id. at 177-86. The side effects caused by antipsychotics should be given great weight
when a court is determining whether involuntary administration of antipsychotic drugs is appropriate
in a given situation. Bachand, supra note 10, at 1077-78. The court must carefully consider the
severity of side effects caused by the drugs, and how those effects will adversely affect a defendant's
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Prior to Sell, the Supreme Court had already established that it held the
power to take away the right of an individual to make autonomous decisions
about actions affecting the body. 14 Specifically, the right to force unwanted
antipsychotic drugs on a prison inmate was first recognized in Washington v.
Harper.5  In Harper, the Court recognized the right of an individual to
refuse unwanted antipsychotic medication.' 6 The Court further clarified the
right of a court to take away a person's right to refuse unwanted medication
in Riggins v. Nevada.'7  In Riggins, the Court approved involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing
criminal charges to ensure the defendant's continued competence to stand
trial. 8  Despite these holdings, until Sell, the Court never explicitly
demeanor. Id. For example, in the trial setting, side effects such as impairment of the ability to
remember or reason efficiently and lethargy may affect a defendant's ability to assist counsel, to
comment on adverse witnesses, or cause general apathy by the defendant towards the outcome of the
trial. Id.
14. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that a mentally ill prison
inmate can be treated with antipsychotic drugs against his will if the inmate is dangerous and
treatment is in the inmate's medical interest); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992)
(determining that an individual's right to refuse medication may be overridden if treatment is
"medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the
defendant's] own safety or the safety of others.").
15. Harper, 494 U.S. at 236. The scenario in Harper represents one of the three main settings in
which the clash between the right of a defendant or inmate to avoid the unwanted administration of
drugs and the government's interest in forcibly medicating an individual has come before the Court.
The first setting, found in Harper, involves medicating "inmates who... are gravely disabled or
represent a significant danger to themselves or others" for their own protection and for protection of
the other inmates. Id. at 226 (addressing the issue of when forcible medication of mentally ill
inmates is appropriate). In the second situation, the government desires forcible medication of a
convicted defendant, who is mentally insane and sentenced to death, in order to render the defendant
sane enough to be executed. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (holding that, under
protection by the Eighth Amendment, the State did not have the power to execute the insane). See
also Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018 (2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 832 (2003) (upholding the
opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, which authorized forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs to the defendant by denying certiorari); David P. S. Charitat, Fraying the
Hangman's Knot?: State v. Michael Owen Perry, 54 LA. L. REv. 1701 (1994) (discussing death
penalty legislation and its relation to insanity and forcible medication using antipsychotic drugs).
Finally, the government may seek the use of antipsychotic drugs to treat "defendant[s] facing serious
criminal charges in order to render th[ose] defendant[s] competent to stand trial." Sell, 539 U.S. at
179. Although the Court has upheld the constitutionality of forcible medication in the first two
scenarios, they have only hinted at the state's right to forcibly medicate a pretrial detainee, as in the
third situation. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
16. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221-22. In Harper, the Court recognized the right to refuse medication
as a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Several
other provisions in the Constitution have been relied upon as the basis for the right of a defendant or
inmate to refuse unwanted medical treatment. See Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984)
(holding that the First Amendment protects the right of a pretrial detainee to refuse antipsychotic
drugs); Sell, 539 U.S. at 177-79 (finding that the Fifth Amendment protects an individual's right to
refuse unwanted medication); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 145 (1992) (concluding that the
Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to refuse undesired drugs); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d
939 (3d Cir. 1976) (determining that the Eighth Amendment protects the right of a person committed
to a psychiatric hospital to refuse involuntary medication); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307
(1982) (upholding the right of an individual to be free from bodily restraint as protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment). Additionally, the common law doctrine of informed consent has been used
to uphold the right to avoid forcible medication. Charitat, supra note 15, at 1711.
17. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
18. Id. at 129-32. Differentiating Sell from Harper and Riggins were the facts that in Sell, the
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addressed the notion of forcing a pretrial detainee, found to be mentally
incompetent, to take antipsychotic drugs solely to render that defendant
competent to stand trial.' 9 Thus, Sell further clarified the Riggins holding,
finding that involuntary medication solely for purposes of establishing trial
competency was constitutionally permissible.20
But before the Sell Court could consider the substantive issue
concerning forcible medication, the Court analyzed a major procedural issue
in the case: whether jurisdiction existed to hear Sell's case.2 The Court
noted that the court of appeals would have only had authority to review the
district court's order, originally permitting forcible medication of Sell, if that
order was considered "final., 22 If the Court had determined that the pretrial
order was not a final order, Sell would have had to wait until after his trial to
pursue an appeal on the forcible medication issue.23 Here, the Court
concluded that the pretrial order was final because it satisfied the collateral-
order doctrine, an exception to the rule that only final judgments are
appealable.24 As such, the Court established jurisdiction to substantively
review Sell's case.25
Because the Sell decision had two significant aspects, the effects of the
case may be felt by two distinct groups: those affected by the approval of
forcible medication to render a defendant competent to stand trial, and those
affected by the Court's determination that a pretrial order for forcible
medication is reviewable as a collateral-order. The effects of the first issue,
forcible medication for trial competency purposes, may be extreme. As for
the general public, the stretch of the Court's ability to take away a person's
right to choose what medications to take are unknown, and the hypothetical
concerning the boy being forced to take Ritalin to attend school might not be
defendant was found not dangerous by the lower courts, and that he was charged with serious, but
non-violent crimes. See Charles Lane, Court Sets Guidelines for Forced Medication, WASH. POST,
June 17, 2003, at A01. It should be noted that, aside from the fraud charges, Sell was also indicted
for attempted murder. Id. However, the attempted murder charge was not technically part of the
appeal at issue, and thus the justices' opinion treats the charge as if it does not exist. Charles Lane,
Justices Debate Medicating Mentally Ill Man for Trial, WASH. POST, March 4, 2003, at A04. The
treatment of this charge, or lack thereof, has drawn criticism on the opinion of the case as being
"unrealistically framed." Id.
19. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
20. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177-83.
21. Id. at 175-77.
22. Id. at 176; see also infra notes 114-40 and accompanying text. A court of appeals only has
authority to review a district court's pretrial order if that order is considered "final." 28 U.S.C. §
1291. As such, if the court of appeals never had jurisdiction to review the district court's order
permitting forcible medication, then the Supreme Court would be lacking jurisdiction to hear Sell's
case. See infra notes 114-40.
23. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175-77.
24. Id. at 176.
25. Id. at 177. This ruling, permitting review of the order to forcibly medicate as a collateral
order, brought vigorous dissent from three of the Justices. Id. at 186-93.
so unimaginable.26 Further, although the Court approved the notion of
forcible medication for trial competency, the Sell Court also enumerated a
stringent four-factor test that a prosecutor must meet in order for a court to
permit forcible medication.27 This test affects mentally ill defendants
because, by only permitting forcible medication to render a defendant
competent to stand trial in specific, rare instances, it recognizes greater
rights for mentally ill defendants.28 Prosecutors will be affected by this test
because the degree of difficulty in satisfying the four factors may actually
deter them from seeking forcible medication order through courts.29
The second issue, the right of a court of appeals to review a pretrial
order for forcible medication, may also have significant effects on various
different groups. This holding has the potential to cause vast trial
disruptions, enabling any defendant claiming that a pretrial court order has
taken away a liberty interest to have a right of appeal.30 Further, this holding
may cause great confusion surrounding the well-settled exception to the final
judgment rule since, prior to Sell, only three exceptions existed in the
criminal law field.3'
This case note will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in Sell v.
United States and its potential future impact on forcible medication of
defendants for the sole purpose of rendering them competent for trial. Part
II examines the historical background of the case law regarding the
development of an individual's right to refuse antipsychotic medications, in
conjunction with a state's ability to override that liberty interest.3 2 Part III
provides a summary of the factual background leading up to the Court's
opinion.33 Part IV analyzes Justice Breyer's opinion for the Court and
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion.34 Part V considers the impact of Sell on:
the well-settled exception to the final judgment rule, the collateral order
doctrine, the burden of proof required of prosecutors seeking a forcible
medication order, defendants declared incompetent for trial purposes, and
the mentally ill in general.35  Finally, Part VI concludes the analysis with
final considerations of the significance of the Court's decision in Sell.36
26. See Associated Press, Ruling Could Force Treatment On Mentally Ill, (Feb. 17, 2004),
available at http://www.cnn.cor/2004/LAW/02/17/mentally.ill.law.ap/index.html (last visited Feb.
3, 2005) (discussing a new law passed in New York permitting "caseworkers, family members and
even roommates to seek a court order to force a mentally ill patient to comply with treatment").
27. Sell, 539 U.S. at 179-81.
28. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 251-58 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 236-57 and accompanying text.
31. See id.
32. See infra Part II and accompanying text.
33. See infra Part III and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part IV and accompanying text.
35. See infra Part V and accompanying text.
36. See infra Part VI and accompanying text.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Establishment of a Competence Standard
Early on in American jurisprudence, the Supreme Court established that
the trial of an incompetent defendant is procedurally unfair.37 More recent
cases have determined that a state trial of an incompetent defendant violates
due process, and thus, a defendant's right to be competent during trial is
constitutionally protected.38 The Court has found support for this right by
reasoning that an incompetent defendant would not be able to participate
meaningfully in the trial. 39 Thus, trying a defendant who lacks the capacity
to present an effective defense would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee to a fair trial.4 °
The Court clarified the standard of competence in Dusky v. United
States.4' The Court held that a defendant must possess two characteristics in
order to be found competent to stand trial: (1) "sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding"
and (2) "rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him., 42  In addition, the Court held that a finding of trial competency
required a defendant to be able to appreciate the potential consequences that
would stem from a conviction. 43
37. Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899); United States v. Chisolm, 149 F.
284, 287 (5th Cir. 1906) (advising that because the defendant was the sole means of defense, his
competence was necessary for a procedurally fair trial).
38. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)
(holding that a trial of an incompetent defendant violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee to
a fair trial).
39. Drope, 420 U.S. at 171. A defendant's meaningful participation in a trial includes such
activities as providing an attorney with facts that might exonerate the defendant, commenting and
understanding the testimony of witnesses, and making strategic and intelligent choices concerning
the trial. Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in
Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1114 (1986).
40. See Fentiman, supra note 39, at 1109.
41. 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
42. Id. at 402; see Nancy Gibbs, David S. Jackson & Romesh Ratnesar, In Fits and Starts:
Kaczynski throws the Unabomb trial into disarray. Is he a master manipulator or just desperately
confused?, TIME, Jan. 19, 1998, at 26 (noting that the standard of competence to stand trial is "a low-
threshold legal matter").
43. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402. See generally Brian Domb, A New Twist in the War on Drugs: The
Constitutional Right of a Mentally Ill Criminal Defendant to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication That
Would Make Him Competent to Stand Trial, 4 J.L. & HEALTH 273, at 279 (1990) (noting that
"Dusky is significant in that the Court held that a defendant needed to be able to do more than
identify facts; he must have some capacity to reason from a simple premise to a simple conclusion")
(emphasis added).
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B. The Use of Forcible Medication to Restore Competency: The State's
Interests
Ten years after establishing the Dusky standard for competence, the
Supreme Court recognized that a state has a substantial interest in bringing
to trial a defendant accused in good faith of violating the law. 44 The Court
reasoned that the power to try an accused is essential in a system of "ordered
liberty," and that it is necessary to maintain peace and social justice.4 ' Thus,
when an accused is declared mentally incompetent under Dusky, the state's
interest in trying the individual essentially develops into the state's interest
in re-establishing that defendant's competency.46 Restoration of competency
is accomplished through treatment of the defendant's mental illness.47
Historically, courts considered any person diagnosed with a mental
illness serious enough to warrant hospitalization incompetent.48 A defendant
classified as such would then be hospitalized for treatment until a
determination could be made that they had attained capacity.49 Once
hospitalized, the importance of the state's interest in the treatment of
committed patients allowed for involuntary treatment of those individuals
while they remained hospitalized.50 Ultimately, if a defendant never actually
attained capacity, commitment within the hospital continued indefinitely,
ending only upon the patient's death.5'
Modem law has established that mental illness does not automatically
equate with incompetence. 52 In 1972, the Supreme Court also determined
that the indefinite commitment of a defendant found mentally incompetent is
unconstitutional.53 A defendant for whom it is determined that there is no
substantial likelihood of restoration of competency in the near future must be
44. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
45. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
46. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
47. Many state statutes have defined competency in terms of a defendant's mental illness. See
Fentiman, supra note 39, at 1118. Thus, in many cases, in determining whether a defendant is
competent or incompetent, the judge and examining psychiatrist have focused on the presence or
absence of mental illness, rather than in terms of the accused's ability to function at trial. Id.
Complicating the process further, there is much debate over the type and quantity of evidence that
must be presented to the Supreme Court for it to make a finding of mental illness, and the Court has
yet to recognize an exact definition. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992). In a concurring
opinion in Foucha, Justice O'Connor noted that "[tlhe only certain thing that can be said about the
present state of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not reached
finality of judgment .. " Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354, 365 n.13 (1983) (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956))).
48. Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Mental Health Law: Its History and Its Future, 20 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 599, 601 (1996).
49. Domb, supra note 43, at 283.
50. Appelbaum, supra note 48 at 601.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 723-39 (1972). In Jackson, the Court held that a
defendant, confined for failure to meet the Dusky standard of competence, could not be held for
more than a period of time necessary to establish whether it is likely that the defendant will regain
capacity in the near future. Id. at 738.
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either released or committed civilly. 54  Subsequently, states became
suspicious of the growing number of pending criminal charges dropped due
to the increasing amount of defendants, especially those facing lengthy
prison sentences, who were declared permanently incompetent. 5 Ironically,
these developments in the law, which recognized greater rights for
incompetents, made the notion of forcible medication against a defendant's
will increasingly popular to states seeking to hold incompetent defendants
responsible for their accused crimes.5 6
C. A Liberty Interest in One's Own Body: The Individual's Interests
The area of law concerning the right of individuals to make autonomous
decisions concerning their bodies has progressed dramatically in the last
thirty years. 7 Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has held that the right to privacy is a fundamental right.58
This right includes the power to make choices about one's own body.59
However, the Court has explicitly held that the right to privacy is not an
absolute right, and that, in certain circumstances, the right may yield to the
state's interests in health, welfare, and safety of its citizens. 60 In those
instances, the state must show a compelling interest, and the Court will
conduct a balancing test to determine whether that interest is indeed
sufficient to override an individual's right to privacy.6i This test is judged
by standard of reasonableness, and the state's alleged need to override
54. Id.
55. Domb, supra note 43, at 283-84.
56. See id. at 284 (discussing effects of state-wide skepticism after Jackson v. Indiana, fueled by
cases of "miraculous recoveries after pending criminal charges were dropped because of a
determination that the defendant would not soon regain competency to be tried," on weaknesses of
the right to refuse antipsychotic medication).
57. See infra, notes 63-93 and accompanying text.
58. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Bachand, supra note 10, at 1059-60.
59. Bachand, supra note 10 at 1060 n.8 (noting Griswold's determination of the right to
privacy's inclusion of the right to make decisions about the body such as whether to use
contraceptives). See also Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1, 9 (lst Cir. 1984) (including decisions
concerning medical treatment in the right to privacy).
60. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 765-67 (1985) (holding that the right to privacy may be
overridden by a compelling state interest). In Mills v. Rogers, the Court determined that, in a
situation where a fundamental constitutional right is at stake, both procedural and substantive
protections must be afforded. 457 U.S. 291, 304-06 (1982). The Court specified that, in order to
satisfy the substantive prong, the "protected constitutional interest" and the "conditions under which
competing state interests might outweigh it" identified and defined. Id. at 299. The procedural
aspect deals with the "minimum procedures required by the Constitution for determining that the
individual's liberty interest actually is outweighed in a particular instance." Id.
61. Winston, 470 U.S. at 756-67 (determining that the state's interest in obtaining a bullet lodged
in the defendant's body, which could potentially link the defendant to an attempted robbery, did not
override the defendant's interest in refusing potentially harmful surgery necessary to remove the
bullet).
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protected privacy rights is determined on by a case-by-case approach.62 It is
from the application of this balancing test through which the Court has
established the standard for a situation in which an individual's right to
refuse medical treatment for mental illness must yield to a state's interest in
restoring the defendant's competence.
D. Case Law Developments: Increasing Protection for an Individual's
Right to Choose
In 1982, the Supreme Court considered the issue of constitutionally
protected liberty interests afforded to the mentally retarded in Youngberg v.
Romeo.63 Romeo, a mentally retarded man involuntarily institutionalized
since childhood, sued the institution for violations of his liberty interests in
safe conditions of confinement and unreasonable bodily restraints. 64
Weighing the justifications offered by the State for restraining Romeo's
liberty against his individual, constitutionally protected rights, the Court
determined that Romeo's rights had been violated.65 Thus, the Court
recognized the right of an individual to be free from bodily restraint, a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.66
Though Youngberg dealt with the right of the mentally retarded to be
free from physical restraints, the reasoning employed by the Court has been
applied to cases involving the issue of forcible medication of the mentally
ill. 67 In 1990, in Washington v. Harper, the Court tackled the novel issue of
62. Id. at 760.
63. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
64. Id. at 309. The Court noted that although Romeo's commitment was brought about through
the proper procedures, he was not deprived of liberty interests guaranteed under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 315. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court looked towards Vitek v. Jones,
which established that, although a "criminal conviction and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an
individual's right to freedom from confinement... they do not authorize the State to classify him as
mentally ill and subject him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without. .. additional due process
protections." Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980). In Vitek, a prisoner challenged the
constitutionality of a state statute permitting the prison director to transfer any prisoner found to be
mentally ill to a mental hospital, which would then subject the prisoner to treatment for the alleged
illness. Id. at 483-86. Balancing the state's interest in treating the mentally ill against the prisoner's
interest in avoiding an arbitrary diagnosis of mental illness and unwanted medical treatment, the
Court concluded that the prisoner's interest was powerful enough to require additional procedural
safeguards. Id. at 493-96. The Court explained that the possibility of error in the state's conclusions
concerning the prisoner's mental health, which could deprive the prisoner of liberties guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment, necessitated actions, such as notice and a hearing, before the
transfer and subsequent treatment could occur. Id.
65. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 320-24. This is the same balancing test established in by the Court in
Winston v. Lee, performed when a substantive right is at stake. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753
(1985). See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
66. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. In Youngberg, the Court chose to analyze the situation under a
low level of scrutiny. Id. at 322-23. As such, liability would only be imposed when the person
responsible for the decision to treat a patient substantially departed from the accepted professional
standards, practices, or judgment on which the decision to treat is usually based. Id.
67. See Domb, supra note 43, at 277 (discussing application of Youngberg to forcible medication
cases). Recognizing the applicability of Youngberg to cases involving forcible medication, the
Supreme Court remanded two cases, in which defendants opposed the unwanted administration of
antipsychotic drugs, to be reconsidered in light of the Youngberg decision. Id. at 277 & n. 19 (noting
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an inmate's right to refuse antipsychotic drugs to treat his mental illness.68
Harper, a mentally ill state prisoner, claimed that a prison policy permitting
medication of prisoners against their will, through use of antipsychotic
drugs, violated due process because the policy did not require a judicial
hearing in order to administer the drugs. 69 The Harper Court divided the
question arising from involuntary medication of the inmates into two
aspects: a substantive due process issue and a procedural due process issue.70
First tackling the substantive due process issue, the Court recognized a
prisoner's right to refuse involuntary antipsychotic medication as a right
protected by the Due Process Clause.71 Using the same framework as it did
in Youngberg, the Court weighed an inmate's liberty interest against the
State's relevant interests to determine if Harper's constitutional rights were
violated.72 Citing the State's legitimate interests in maintaining a safe prison
environment, the Court found that this interest could outweigh the
individual's liberty interest in avoiding administration of unwanted
antipsychotic drugs.73 However, the Court limited instances in which
curtailment of the liberty interest was appropriate, stating that "the Due
Process Clause permits the State to treat a prison inmate [with] a serious
mental illness with antipsychotic drugs against his will, if the inmate is
dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's medical
",74interest.
' 4
that the two cases remanded were Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 198 1), vacated by 458 U.S.
1119 (1982), and Scott v. Plante, 641 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated by 458 U.S. 1119 (1982)).
68. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). Though the Court had established an individual's constitutionally
protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment many years earlier, it had never explicitly
addressed the issue of refusal of treatment with antipsychotic medication until Harper. See Jacobson
v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. II (1905) (recognizing a constitutionally protected right of an individual
to refuse unwanted medical treatment).
69. Harper, 494 U.S. at 213.
70. Id. at 220 (defining the substantive issue as "what factual circumstances must exist before the
State may administer antipsychotic drugs to the prisoner against his will" and defining the
procedural issue as "whether the State's nonjudicial mechanisms used to determine the facts in a
particular case are sufficient").
71. Id. at 221-22. Here, the Court cited Youngberg as standing for the principle that a prisoner
"possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 221-27. See also supra notes 51-54, 57 and accompanying text.
73. Harper, 494 U.S. at 225-26. Other courts have applied this same balancing test established
in Youngberg, in cases dealing with a defendant's right to refuse medications. See, e.g., United
States v. Charters, 829 F. 2d 479, 498 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that a defendant's liberty interest in
refusing medication must be balanced in the state's interest in trying the accused); Bee v. Greaves,
744 F.2d 1387, 1394-95 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that the state must demonstrate a compelling
interest in order to override a defendant's liberty interest), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1985).
74. Harper, 494 U.S. at 227 (noting that because the instant prison policy comported with these
two requirements, the policy satisfied the substantive due process aspect of the forcible medication
issue).
737
The Court then examined the procedural due process issue raised in
Harper to ensure that a decision to involuntarily medicate a defendant would
not be made arbitrarily or erroneously." The Court focused on the severity
of antipsychotic drugs and the side effects the user may experience.
76
Finding these risks to be best assessed by medical professionals, rather than
a court, the Court found that the procedures in the prison policy which
determined the need for medication, met the requirements of procedural due
process.77
Riggins v. Nevada7 8 provided the next opportunity for the Court to limit
a state's authority to administer antipsychotic medications against an
individual's will. 79 Unlike Harper, which involved involuntary medication
of a convicted inmate, Riggins involved the right of the state to forcibly
medicate a defendant with antipsychotics to ensure his continued
competence to stand trial. 80  First acknowledging the constitutionally
protected liberty interest to avoid unwanted antipsychotic drugs established
in Harper,8' the Court inferred that in light of the due process protections
afforded mentally ill inmates, the Fourteenth Amendment provides at least
as much protection for pre-trial detainees held by a state. 82 Again
referencing Harper,83 the Riggins Court acknowledged the substantial
interference with an individual's liberty interest associated with the severe
75. Id. at 228. The instant prison policy provided regulations for treatment using antipsychotic
drugs, and stated that involuntary treatment was only appropriate after an examining psychiatrist
found the inmate to be suffering from a mental disorder. Id. at 232-33. In addition, the psychiatrist
was required to find the inmate gravely disabled, or a substantial likelihood that the defendant would
cause harm to himself, others, or their property. Id. at 232. An inmate who subsequently refused
antipsychotic medication was entitled to a hearing, and involuntarily treatment could only be
continued if period reviews were given. Id. at 232-33.
76. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
77. Harper, 494 U.S. at 234. In arriving at its conclusion that the decision to medicate was
appropriately left to the discretion of a medical professional, rather than a judge, the Court again
cited Youngberg, noting that "the Constitution does not prohibit the State from permitting medical
personnel to make the decision under fair procedural mechanisms." Id. at 231 (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-23 (1982)).
78. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
79. See id.
80. Id. at 129-32. Charged with murder, Riggins began treatment with antipsychotic drugs while
in custody awaiting his trial. Id. at 129. Before trial, Riggins filed a motion to discontinue his
treatment with the drugs, which was denied by the district court. Id. at 131. Thus, Riggins was
involuntarily administered the drugs during his entire trial. Id.
81. Id. at 133-34.
82. Id. at 135. The Court cited Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979), as support for the
notion that constitutionally protected liberty interests of pre-trial detainees cannot be limited without
findings of an overriding interest and medical appropriateness. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. Prior
to Riggins, in Bell, the Court analyzed constitutional rights afforded to pre-trial detainees. See Bell,
441 U.S. at 523. The Court determined that detention practices must be analyzed in light of the
state's interest in maintaining safety, discipline, and order in the prison system. See id. at 547. The
Court concluded that, in certain circumstances, the state's interests may override the liberty interests
enjoyed by both prisoners and pre-trial detainees, and thus limitation of these rights may be
appropriate. Id. at 546. See also Angelina N. McDonald, In Search of a Standard of Review:
Decisions to Forcibly Medicate Pre-Trial Detainees in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 72 U. CIN. L.
REv. 285, 288 (2003) (discussing Bell in the progression of case law that eventually culminated in
Riggins).
83. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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side effects caused by antipsychotics.84 The Court also focused on the
strong likelihood of trial prejudice that could result from the side effects of
antipsychotic drugs on Riggins' outward appearance, on the content of his
testimony, and on his ability to follow the proceedings or communicate with
counsel.8 5
The Riggins Court held that, an individual's liberty interest in refusing
antipsychotics may be overridden with a showing by the State that
"treatment with antipsychotic medication [is] medically appropriate and,
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of [the
defendant's] own safety or the safety of others. 8 6 Likewise, due process
would be satisfied if the State could establish that "it could not obtain an
adjudication of [the defendant's] guilt or innocence by using less intrusive
means." 87 However, by permitting administration of antipsychotic drugs to
Riggins without determining the necessity of the treatment or considering
any reasonable alternatives, the district court failed to acknowledge Riggins'
liberty interest in refusing treatment with the drugs.88 As such, without any
demonstration by the government that "administration of antipsychotic
medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy," the Court
84. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134.
85. Id. at 137. See also Bachand, supra note 10, at 1077-82 (discussing many problems
associated with trying defendants medicated with antipsychotics). If a state tried a defendant who is
taking antipsychotics, the state actually may be trying an incompetent defendant. Id. at 1078. In
addition to affecting the defendant's mental abilities, antipsychotics may lead to prejudice by the
judge or jury due to effects the drugs may have on the defendant's appearances. Id. at 1079-80. See,
e.g., In re Pray, 336 A.2d 174 (Vt. 1975); State v. Murphy, 355 P.2d 323, 325 (Wash. 1960) (en
banc) (discussing the effects of a defendant's medicated appearance on a jury).
86. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. This was the standard established in Harper. See supra note 74
and accompanying text.
87. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135. Consequently, if these conditions are met, the Constitution permits
forced medication in order to render a defendant charged with murder, such as Riggins, competent to
stand trial. See id. Although the Court did not expressly state such a conclusion, they alluded to this
principle by reasoning that, if the district court established that treatment was medically appropriate
and, considering reasonable alternatives, was essential for either Riggins' safety or for the safety of
others, the due process requirements necessary for forcible medication in the trial or pre-trial setting
would have been met. Id. at 135. As such, it can be inferred that the district court would have been
justified in administering antipsychotic drugs to Riggins, against his will, solely for the purpose of
trying him for the murder of which he was accused.
88. Id. at 136-37. Due to the district court's failure to make any conclusions about reasonable
alternatives or any findings on the medical appropriateness of Riggins' treatment, the Riggins Court
declined to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny to review decisions of forcible medication using
antipsychotics. Id. at 136. But see id. at 156 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas noted that the
majority:
[Alppears to adopt a standard of strict scrutiny.., specifically fault[ing] the trial court for
failing to find either that the "continued administration of [antipsychotics] was required
to ensure that the defendant could be tried".., or that "other compelling concerns
outweighed Riggins' interest in freedom from unwanted antipsychotic drugs."
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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concluded that the state erred in its attempt to forcibly administer
antipsychotic drugs to Riggins. 89
Taken together, Harper and Riggins indicate the Court's consent to the
principle that, if certain conditions are satisfied, due process permits a state
to involuntarily administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant
facing criminal charges to restore that defendant's competence to stand
trial.90 However, Riggins failed to answer many significant questions
surrounding the issue of forcible medication of pre-trial detainees. First,
Riggins left undecided whether establishing competence to stand trial alone
would be considered an "essential state policy" for purposes of forcible
medication.9" Second, Riggins failed to explicitly address involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs to non-dangerous, mentally ill
defendants facing criminal charges.92 Third, the Riggins Court refused to
define what is needed to ensure that the requirement of "medically
appropriate" treatment is satisfied.93 Finally, Riggins clearly did not attempt
to establish the standard of review courts should exercise in reviewing
decisions to forcibly medicate a defendant.94 After Riggins, eleven years
passed before the Court received its opportunity to answer these questions.
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In September 1982, a dentist named Charles Sell told other doctors that
communists had contaminated the gold used in his patients' fillings. 9'
Subsequently hospitalized for his mental illness and treated with
antipsychotic drugs, Sell was discharged.96 Over the next thirteen years,
Sell's illness led to various encounters with law enforcement, including a
charge of insurance fraud for submitting false claims in 1997. 97 Found
mentally competent by the magistrate judge, and released on bail, Sell was
later indicted on charges of mail fraud, Medicaid fraud, and money
laundering, charges which superseded the previous fraud charge.98
The following year, Sell's behavior at a bail revocation hearing, which
included screaming, using racial epithets, and spitting in the judge's face, led
the magistrate to revoke his bail.99 A few months later, in April, Sell was
89. Id. at 138.
90. See id.
91. See supra notes 78-89 and accompanying text.
92. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 133 (1992).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 136-37.
95. Sell v. United States, 530 U.S. 166, 169 (2003).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 170. Sell's illness resurfaced in June 1984, when he called the police to complain of a
leopard outside of his office window. Id. at 169. Examples of Sell's later run-ins with police
included his claim that a State Governor and police chief were attempting to kill him, and Sell's
claim that a voice told him that a soul would be saved in exchange for every FBI personnel Sell
killed. Id. at 170.
98. Id.
99. Id. The magistrate's decision was also based on the report of a psychiatrist who informed the
judge that "Sell's condition had worsened." Id. In addition, in early 1998, at some time between
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indicted on two other, more serious charges: the attempted murders of an
FBI officer who had previously arrested him and of a former employee who
intended to testify against Sell in the prior fraud case." ° Sell asked the
magistrate to reconsider the prior finding of his competence to stand trial,
and after a psychiatric exam, the magistrate found Sell incompetent for trial
purposes. 1 The judge ordered Sell to be sent to a medical center for
prisoners, for a determination whether his capacity to stand trial would
return.10 2 In June 1999, after Sell refused to take antipsychotic medication,
the institution staff sought the court's approval of administration of the
medication against Sell's will. 10 3 The decision to forcibly medicate Sell then
became subject to five levels of hierarchical review.' 4
First, a psychiatrist examined Sell's medical history and current mental
state, and determined that, because of Sell's dangerousness and the necessity
of the medication to treat his illness, forcible administration of the drugs was
appropriate. 10 5  Next, prison officials administratively reviewed the
psychiatrist's decision."06  Taking into account Sell's past and present
behavior, the officials believed Sell posed a threat to others, and affirmed the
psychiatrist's opinion that antipsychotic medication would help Sell's
illness.'0 7 Third, Sell filed a motion with the court seeking an order to
reverse the medical center's decision to forcibly administer the drugs, which
prompted the magistrate to hold a hearing. 0 8 Testimony from medical
center personnel showed that Sell's inappropriate behavior in the institution
gave no signs of ceasing, and indicated that Sell was a safety risk' °9
Thereafter, in August 2000, the magistrate found that treatment with
Sell's 1997 charges and the bail revocation hearing, the government accused Sell of having sought to
intimidate a witness. Id.
100. Id. The fraud charges were joined with the attempted murder charges for trial. Id.
101. Id. at 170-71.
102. Id. at 171.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 171-72. The psychiatrist did, however, consider Sell dangerous outside, but not
necessarily inside, the jail, and found that Sell was capable of functioning in the prison environment.
Id. at 172.
106. Id.
107. Id. At this hearing, evidence was introduced concerning the antipsychotics recommended for
Sell. Id. The State introduced evidence that the drugs appeared to be the treatment most likely to
improve Sell's behavior and that other less intrusive measures were unlikely to help his illness. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 172-73. During the hearing, the State introduced evidence about an incident that
occurred after the administrative hearing. Sell had allegedly approached a nurse working at the
institution and told her he was in love with her, then criticized her for not responding to his
advances. Id. He had then told the nurse that he couldn't help acting the way he did. Id. The State
also offered evidence concerning the effectiveness of treatment with antipsychotic medication. Id. at
172. Finally, the State informed the court that Sell had been transferred to a locked cell. Id. at 173.
antipsychotics was the only way to ensure that Sell would not only be less
dangerous, but also competent to stand trial.' 0
In the fourth level of escalation of the decision to medicate, Sell
appealed the magistrate's decision to the federal district court."' Noting that
Sell had been moved from a locked cell back into the open ward, the court
held that the magistrate's finding of Sell's dangerousness was in error."'
Nevertheless, the court affirmed the order to involuntarily medicate Sell
because antipsychotic drugs were "the only viable hope of rendering [Sell]
competent to stand trial.""' 3 Finally, during the last level of review in March
2002, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the district court's
decision." 4 Using the framework established by the Court in Riggins, the
Eighth Circuit found that antipsychotic drugs were medically appropriate,
that no less intrusive means of treating Sell were available, and that the
government had an essential interest in trying the accused.' '5 As a result,
forced medication was warranted." 6 Thereafter, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to determine whether the Eighth Circuit's decision to allow
forcible medication, solely for trial competency purposes, violated Sell's
constitutional rights.1
7
IV. THE COURT OPINIONS
A. Justice Breyer's Majority Opinion18
1. The District Court's Decision is Appealable as a Collateral-Order
After a district court has issued an order, a federal court of appeals is
authorized to hear the appeal and subsequently render its own decision, but
only if the district court's order is considered "final." 19 "Final decisions"12
0
generally refer to final judgments that terminate a proceeding, such as an
adjudication of guilt or innocence in a criminal trial. 2 ' As such, a defendant
110. Id. at 173.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 173-74. The district court limited its conclusion that the magistrate was in error to
dangerousness in regards to Sell himself and those in the institution. Id. at 174.
113. Id. (citations omitted). The Court also made findings that the drugs were medically
appropriate and necessary for the state's interest in bringing an accused to trial. Id.
114. United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2002).
115. Id. at 568-72.
116. Id.
117. Sell, 539 U.S. at 175.
118. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsberg joined Justice
Breyer's onion.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000). Specifically, the statute permits federal courts of appeal to review
"final decisions of the district courts." Id.-
120. Id.
121. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176; see also Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945).
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like Charles Sell usually must wait until the end of a trial before a court of
appeals has jurisdiction to review a pretrial order.1 22
As a pretrial order, the order authorizing the forcible medication of Sell,
issued by the district court in April 2001, did not fall within the statutory
definition of a final decision. 23 Therefore, before the Supreme Court could
delve into the substantive issue of forcible medication for trial competency,
the Court needed to determine whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction
to hear Sell's appeal of the order.
124
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer 25 first acknowledged an exception
to the general rule that only final judgments made by the district court are
reviewable on appeal. 126  This exception, called the "collateral-order"
exception, enables a judgment made by a district court, which fails to satisfy
the traditional definition of a final decision, to be appealable nonetheless.
127
In order to fall within the collateral-order exception, an order must (1)
"conclusively determine[] the disputed question," (2) "resolve[] an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action," and (3) "[be]
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."' 128
Using this three-part analysis, Justice Breyer found that the district
court's order fell within the exception. 129 First, the disputed question was
whether Sell had a legal right to refuse forcible treatment with
antipsychotics. 30 The order that Sell be forcibly medicated against his will
conclusively determined this very question.' Next, Justice Breyer found
that the order resolved an important issue. 32  In past cases involving the
right to refuse medical treatment, the Court has repeatedly noted the
importance of the constitutional issues raised. 33  Furthermore, this issue,
122. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.
123. See id. (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1951)).
124. Id. at 175.
125. Id. at 169.
126. Id. at 176.
127. See id; see also Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949)
(articulating the three characteristics decisions must have to fall within the collateral-order exception
to the final judgment rule); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867 (1994)
(defining the "collateral order doctrine... not as an exception to the 'final decision' rule .. . but as a
'practical construction' of it .... ).
128. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
129. Id. It may seem unusual to permit review of the district court's order in Sell's case because
the collateral-order doctrine is generally used in civil cases, and courts rarely apply the exception in
criminal cases. Kathy Swedlow, Forced Medication of Legally Incompetent Prisoners: A Primer,
HUM. RTS. 3, at 3, 5 (2003); see also Sell, 539 U.S. at 186-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
court of appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the district court's order).
130. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. Id. Here, the Court cites to a number of cases involving involuntarily administered medical
treatment, and in which the Court has noted the significance of the liberty interests at stake. See e.g.,
Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 134 (1992) (finding that only "essential" state interests could
whether Sell must undertake treatment against his will, is also separate from
the merits of the case, which involves a completely separate issue: whether
Sell is guilty or innocent of the crimes he is alleged to have committed. 
34
Finally, Justice Breyer determined that the issue of Sell's right to refuse
medication would be essentially unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment. 35  Since Sell will have already been forcibly medicated by the
time of his trial, thus, he will have already suffered the same harm he is
attempting to avoid. 136 Even if Sell was to be found not guilty, the harm
could not be undone, as he would have no opportunity to appeal if
acquitted.
1 37
Sell's case is distinguishable from other pretrial orders that are not
appealable collaterally because of "the severity of the intrusion and
corresponding importance of the constitutional issue."' 138 The issue at hand,
override the constitutionally protected liberty interest to forcible medication of antipsychotic drugs
possessed by an individual); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990)
(drawing attention to the importance of the liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,
previously recognized by this Court, before applying that right to the issue of forced administration
of life-sustaining medical treatment to an incompetent person); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,
221-22 (1990) (noting the significance of an inmate's liberty interest in avoiding "unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs [protected by] the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (holding that "[a] compelled surgical
intrusion into an individual's body ... implicates expectations of privacy and security" of great
importance).
134. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176.
135. Id. at 176-77. A judgment from a district court permitting involuntary administration of
drugs to a mentally ill defendant is different from other types of pretrial orders issued concerning
criminal defendants because its results are "effectively unreviewable on appeal." Swedlow, supra
note 129, at 5.
136. Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77. An example of the differences between an order to forcibly
medicate in a criminal trial and other pretrial orders issued during criminal cases, which are not
considered exceptions to the final judgment rule, may be found by examining a motion to suppress.
Swedlow, supra note 129, at 5. If the district court denied a defendant's motion to suppress, thereby
permitting introduction of the evidence at trial, the court of appeals is able to later assess the trial
record to determine if the evidence was improperly admitted and the resulting effect of that evidence
on the trial. Id. However, in the case of a pretrial order that grants the State permission to forcibly
medicate with antipsychotics, the court of appeals cannot effectively review a complete record
because the antipsychotics may have affected the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings,
and the defendant's outward appearance or demeanor. Id.; see also supra notes 12-13 and
accompanying text. Justice O'Connor articulated this risk in Riggins, by focusing on the possible
side effects of antipsychotics on patients, and the risk of trial prejudice the drugs may induce. See
Swedlow, supra note 129, at 5.
137. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. Justice Breyer cites Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), for support of
this argument. Id. In Stack, a defendant sought appeal of the district court's order denying a
reduction of the bail that had been set for the defendant, claiming the bail amount was excessive.
Stack, 342 U.S. at 3-4. The Court held that the order was appealable as a final decision. Id. at 6-7.
Justice Breyer presumably analogizes this scenario with that of a forcibly medicated defendant
because if a court of appeals fails to review an order fixing bail before a final sentence or judgment
is rendered, it will never be reviewed at all. See id. at 12 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in pars).
138. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177. Specifically, Justice Breyer is contrasting Sell's case with the
examples raised by Justice Scalia in his dissent. See id. at 190-91 (Scalia, J., dissenting). These
examples included pretrial orders forcing a defendant to wear an electronic bracelet, a district court's
order making it impermissible for a defendant to wear a shirt with the words "Black Power" on it,
and an order compelling a defendant to testify. Id. Despite this comparison, Justice Breyer fails to
adequately support his argument distinguishing Sell from other orders immune to the collateral-order
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whether Sell has a right to refuse medical treatment because the drugs may
cause his trial to be unfair, must also be contrasted with the separate issue of
whether forced medication actually caused a trial to be unfair. 139 The issue
in the instant case focuses on Sell's right to refuse unwanted medication.
140
What may occur at the trial as a result of administration of the drugs is mere
speculation. 141 Thus, if the first right is not appealable as a collateral-order,
but only as an "ordinary appeal," then Sell will be unable to enforce his right
to refuse medication. 1
42
This result must be compared with the second question, which focuses
upon a defendant's right to a fair trial by looking at what actually occurred
in the trial as a consequence of the defendant's usage of the drugs. 143 Unlike
the result in the above scenario, a post-trial appeal would still permit a
defendant to vindicate the second right in question.'" In light of the
foregoing argument, Justice Breyer found the district court's order
appealable as a collateral-order, and thus the court of appeal's jurisdiction
was appropriate. 4 5 As such, the Court had jurisdiction to address next issue
exception. See Swedlow, supra note 129, at 5. Years ago, in his Harper opinion, Justice Stevens
attempted to articulate the unique aspects of antipsychotic medication, describing the drug's effects
as both a physical and psychological, and accusing the government of having the ability to control
the minds of those medicated by the drugs. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990).
However, even this more detailed breakdown of the characteristics exclusive to antipsychotics failed
to demonstrate why forcible administration of antipsychotics is an exception to the rules of
jurisdiction. Id.; see also infra note 231.
139. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see also United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 951 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding the district
court's order, which held that an administrative hearing satisfied the due process ights of a
defendant who was to be forcibly administered antipsychotics, immediately appealable as a
collateral-order "[b]ecause... it would be of little value to [the defendant] for th[e] court... to
review his due-process claim after he ha[d] been forcibly medicated and the trial hald] concluded").
145. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177; see also Brandon, 158 F.3d at 949-51. Brandon involved a pretrial
detainee who sought to determine whether due process required that a judicial hearing be conducted
before the State could forcibly medicate him with antipsychotic medication to render him competent
to stand trial. Id. Before the Brandon court examined the judicial hearing issue, the court focused
on whether the district court's order, which held that an administrative hearing on the issue of
forcible medication satisfied Brandon's due process rights, was a collateral-order and thus
immediately appealable. See id. at 950-51. The court applied the three-step test and found the order
fit within the collateral-order exception to the final judgment rule. Id. at 951; see also supra note
127 and accompanying text. The court found that the order conclusively determined the disputed
issue because it decided that an administrative hearing satisfies due process requirements. Brandon,
158 F.3d at 951. Next, the order resolved an issue completely separate from the merits of the charge
against Brandon, sending threatening mail, since the order was concerned with an administrative
hearing's sufficiency to protect Brandon's due process rights. Id. Finally, the order would be
effectively unreviewable on appeal because review of the district court's order would be without
value after Brandon had been forcibly administered the drugs and the trial concluded. Id.
at hand: whether Sell possessed a constitutionally protected right to refuse
involuntary medication. 1
46
2. The Due Process Clause Issue: Does the Forcible Administration of
Antipsychotic Drugs to Render Sell, A Non-Dangerous Pretrial
Detainee, Competent to Stand Trial Violate His Constitutionally
Protected Right to Refuse Medical Treatment?
a. Tightening the Standards for Forcible Medication
Although the Supreme Court addressed the issue of involuntary
medication of criminal defendants with antipsychotic drugs twice before the
Sell decision, the Court never explicitly addressed the constitutionality of
forcible medication solely for trial competency purposes. 147 The more recent
of the two cases, Riggins, failed to clearly establish the standard a state
would have to meet in order to justify overriding a defendant's
constitutionally protected liberty interest to refuse medical treatment. 148 The
Riggins opinion offered general terms, never articulating the exact standard
of review that courts should use when looking, at decisions to forcibly
medicate, or which test or factors should be applied in employing that
standard of review. 49  Thus, though many courts have faced the same
question since Riggins, whether a state can forcibly medicate incompetent
criminal defendants, the method of analysis used to determine the answer
has varied between each court.
50
In an attempt to alleviate any confusion left behind from the Harper and
Riggins holdings,'' Justice Breyer used the analyses set forth in these
146. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177.
147. See generally Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127
(1992).
148. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127, 138. Though the Court alluded to an "essential state policy"
that could justify involuntary medication of a criminal defendant, it failed to identify what would be
considered such a policy. Id. Further, the Court recognized that a state would be able to justify
forcible treatment with a showing that "it could not obtain an adjudication of [the defendant's] guilt
or innocence by using less intrusive means," but failed to note what substantive test the state would
have to meet in order to possess such a right. Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted). See also David M.
Siegel, Psychoactive Medication and Your Client: Better Living and (Maybe) Better Law Through
Chemistry, 27 DEC CHAMPION 22, 23 (2003).
149. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 127, 136 (noting the majority opinion's language stating that "we do
not 'adopt a standard of strict scrutiny,"' and subsequently failing to articulate either the standard of
review the Court used in Riggins' case, or that which should be used in future cases) (citations
omitted); Aaron M. Nance, Comment, Balking at Buying What the Eighth Circuit is Sell-ing: United
States v. Sell and the Involuntary Medication of Incompetent, Non-Dangerous, Pretrial Detainees
Cloaked With the Presumption of Innocence, 71 UMKC L. REv. 685, 694 (2003) (stating that, as a
result of Riggins' failure to clarify the standard of review, "[t]here is no shortage of case law
regarding whether the State can 'forc[ibly] medicate' incompetent detainees of one sort or another,
but there is no consensus regarding how to analyze or decide the situation properly").
150. " See United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 879-80 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing a comprehensive
list of cases that have used different methods of analysis to deal with the issue of forcible
medication, both pre- and post-Riggins).
151. See id.
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opinions as the framework for his opinion in Sell. 52 Justice Breyer drew an
inference from the two cases that it is constitutional for "the Government
involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant
facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent
to stand trial," but only if the Government can prove that: (1) medication is
medically appropriate, (2) the defendant will not fail to receive a fair trial as
a result of the drugs, (3) involuntary medication is the least intrusive
alternative available to further the state's interests, and (4) treatment is
necessary to further the state's interest in a fair trial. 153 Thus, although this
standard technically permits forcible medication of incompetent defendants
who pose no danger, solely for purposes of trial' competence, the occasions
in which the government will be able to meet this burden will be rare.
154
This standard becomes even more difficult to meet, when the four
implications within the words of these requirements are examined.
55
First, a court faced with the issue at hand must find that "important
governmental interests are at stake."' 5 6  Bringing to trial an individual
accused of a serious crime, against either property or another person, is
considered an important government interest.'57 Application of criminal law
152. Sell, 539 U.S. at 177-78. The Sell Court chose to focus on Sell's Fifth Amendment due
process right to refuse involuntary medication. Id. However, Justice Breyer's failure to address
Sell's First Amendment right of freedom of thought has drawn criticism. See Heidi Lypps, Better
Justice Through Chemistry, Does the New Court Standard Really Protect Our Rights?, available at
Ragged Edge Online, http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/extra/self-lypps.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2005). "[I]nterfering with Sell's brain chemistry is tantamount to mind control-the ultimate prior
restraint on freedom of speech." Id. (reiterating the view of The Center for Cognitive Liberty &
Ethics, a nonprofit organization that filed a brief with the Court on Sell's behalf).
153. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 179. This holding is well-supported because Justice Breyer drew on the
standards articulated by the Court in both Harper and Riggins for this standard, obvious after a
review of those two decisions. In Harper, the Court permitted the state to forcibly medicate a
mentally ill inmate who was dangerous to himself and others, as long as the treatment was in the
inmate's medical interest. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990). Justice Breyer
presumably fails to include the requirement that the defendant be a danger to himself or others
because Sell was found to be non-violent. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185. In Riggins, the Court noted that, if
the state had shown that medication was medically appropriate and essential for either the
defendant's safety or the safety of others, as long as there were no less intrusive alternative available,
forcible medication would have been approved. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
154. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. This standard has been said to make approval of forcible medication
harder to achieve. See Robert B. 'Bluey, Supreme Court Makes It Tougher to Forcibly Drug Inmates,
June 17, 2003, available at http://www.CNSNEWS.COM (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (quoting Sell's
attorney as saying that this standard not only makes it difficult for the government to forcibly
medicate defendants who pose no danger, such as Sell, solely for trial competence purposes, but it
also demonstrates the Court's view that it is highly unlikely that the government will actually ever
meet this burden).
155. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-82.
156. Id.
157. Id. Though this notion has been well-established in prior cases, Justice Breyer does not fully
explain the standard of a "serious crime." See supra Part I (B); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970) (finding that the Government's interest in trying the accused is significant). "The Court in
Sell did not ... offer any definition or explanation of what it considered to be a 'serious' crime."
United States v. Evans, 293 F. Supp. 2d 668, 673 (W.D. Va. 2003). See also United States v.
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to those accused of crimes enables the government to satisfy the human need
for security. 158  Despite the significance of the government's interest in
prosecuting criminals, courts must analyze each case individually to
determine if the presence of certain factors might lessen the importance of
that interest. 59 For example, a defendant's refusal to take drugs voluntarily
may lead to a lengthy confinement in a mental institution. 60 As such, the
risks normally associated with permitting one who has committed a criminal
act to escape without punishment are less likely to occur. 61  Though
potential confinement may reduce the government's interest, it does not
completely eliminate it.' 62 The government also has a significant interest in
assuring that every defendant receives a fair trial.
163
Second, the court must find that "involuntary medication will
significantly further those concomitant state interests."' 64 As such, the court
must conclude that administration of antipsychotics is "substantially likely"
to restore the defendant's competence to stand trial. 65 The court must also
find it highly unlikely that any side effects of the drugs will inhibit the
defendant's ability to participate in the preparation of his trial defense,
therefore causing the defendant to have an unfair trial. 1
66
Third, the court must determine that "involuntary medication is
necessary to further those interests," meaning the "court must find that any
alternative, less intrusive treatments are unlikely to achieve substantially the
Kourey, 276 F. Supp. 2d 580, 585 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (finding that the Sell standard did not apply to
a defendant seeking to avoid forcible medication in part because the defendant, charged with
violating the terms of a period of supervised release from prison imposed for his commission of a
misdemeanor, did not face "serious criminal charges ... ").
158. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. Again, Justice Breyer supports this statement with a quote from
Illinois. "'Power to bring an accused to trial is fundamental to a scheme of 'ordered liberty' and
prerequisite to social justice and peace."' Id. (quoting Illinois, 397 U.S. at 347 (Brennan, J.,
concurring)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. Here, Justice Breyer cautioned that he was not attempting to suggest that commitment to
an institution should be thought of as a replacement for a criminal trial. Id. The government's
interest in a timely trial is substantial; due to the chance of faded memories and lost evidence, it may
prove difficult to try a defendant whose competence is restored years after commitment has begun.
Id.
162. Id. Another example of a situation in which the government's interest in prosecution may be
reduced is when the defendant "has already been confined for a significant amount of time (for
which he would receive credit toward any sentence ultimately imposed)." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3585(b)).
163. See id.
164. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
165. Id.
166. Id.; see also Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 142-45 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(noting the ways in which forcible treatment with antipsychotic drugs can cause trial prejudice).
Justice Breyer's mere mention of the possibility of trial prejudice does not give ample weight to the
issue. A state that tries a defendant taking antipsychotics may actually be trying an incompetent
defendant. Bachand, supra note 10 at 1059, 1079. Impairment of mental abilities, exterior
appearance of a medicated defendant that may prejudice a jury, and the potential decrease in
motivation leading to weaker trial defense are proven side effects of antipsychotics. See id. at 1078-
1080. Thus, although the State may be forcibly administering the drugs in order to restore
competence, the medicated state of the defendant may actually still be that of an incompetent. Id.
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same results.' 67 The court must also consider the least intrusive manner of
administering the drugs. 168  An example of a less intrusive manner of
compelling a defendant to take antipsychotics is a court order supported with
contempt sanctions.
169
Finally, the court must find that "administration of the drugs is
medically appropriate, i.e., in the patient's best medical interest in light of
his medical condition."'' 70  Justice Breyer noted the significance of the
specific types of drugs used, since different drugs produce varying benefits
or consequences. 171
The Court emphasized that this four-part standard applies to cases
involving forcible administration of drugs in order to render a defendant
competent to stand trial. 72 However, if forcible medication is necessary for
another reason, such as "the purposes set out in Harper related to the
individual's dangerousness or purposes related to the individual's own
interests where refusal to take drugs puts his health gravely at risk," then the
court will not have to consider whether forcible medication is warranted for
167. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. Justice Breyer does not emphasize the different options courts must
consider by explicitly mentioning other cases in which alternatives to antipsychotic drugs have been
used to treat mentally ill patients, prisoners, and pretrial detainees. Id. See, e.g., Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (allowing soft physical restraints to be used on an institutionalized
mental patient); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 226-27 (1990) (noting the lower court's
finding that antipsychotic drugs would be more effective than physical restraints or seclusion in
meeting the state's interest in maintaining order in a prison and control over an inmate); Bee v.
Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1396 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1214 (1980) (concluding that
only if less intrusive means such as sedatives, tranquilizers, or isolation could not meet the needs of
an emergency situation would permission be granted to forcibly administer antipsychotics to a
pretrial detainee).
168. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
169. Id. Though the Court does mention that non-drug therapies can prove to be effective in
restoring a defendant's competence, the Court does not specifically address these alternatives.
Other, less intrusive alternatives used to help restore competency are verbal psychotherapy and
behavior modification techniques that utilize positive reinforcement. Domb, supra note 43, at 304.
Another alternative to forcibly administering antipsychotics to a defendant would be to "view a
defendant's decision to refuse antipsychotic medication as a waiver in advance of his due process
right to be tried while competent should the absence of medication cause decompensation." Id. at
305. This option effectively addresses concerns of the state that defendants may use the
incompetency doctrine to avoid trial. Id. "It seems reasonable to extend this ability to waive being
tried while competent in order to avoid the acknowledged powerful side effects that the
antipsychotics produce." Id. at 306 (citing to Commonwealth v. Louraine, 453 N.E.2d 437 (1983)
(upholding an accused's right to waive being tried while competent in order to demonstrate his
demeanor accurately by presenting testimony to the jury while he was in an unmedicated state)).
170. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. This notion, drawn directly from both Harper and Riggins, is amply
supported. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 227 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 135
(1992).
171. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. This argument is clearly supported with medical research. See
Douglas Mossman, Unbuckling the "Chemical Straitjacket": The Legal Significance of Recent
Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033, 1062-69
(discussing the benefits and impact of antipsychotic drugs, and how the drugs work to alleviate many
of the negative symptoms suffered by those afflicted with mental illnesses).
172. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181.
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competency purposes. 173 Justice Breyer then stated that courts should first
determine whether forcible medication may be justified on similar
alternative grounds before examining the trial competence issue, and gave
two main reasons in support of this notion. 174 First, Justice Breyer argued
that the analysis used to determine whether medication is appropriate in
cases where an individual is dangerous, is more "objective and manageable"
than the analysis used to determine whether medication should be
administered for competency purposes.
75
The second reason for inquiring into alternative grounds to forcibly
medicate before examining an individual's competence is that courts
generally treat issues of involuntary medication as a civil matter, justified on
alternative grounds such as those listed above. 176  Every state provides a
manner in which a doctor or hospital that determines that medication is in an
incompetent defendant's best interest can take civil action to attain an order
to medicate by petitioning the court for the appointment of a guardian for the
defendant. 77  If appointed, the guardian takes over decision-making
concerning medication for a patient who lacks the capacity to make any such
decision, and the guardian can then authorize medication. 178  In these civil
proceedings, permission to involuntarily medicate may be granted by the
court if a patient's refusal to take antipsychotics poses a danger to the patient
or others. 1
79
As mentioned, a court can authorize medication on one of these
grounds, it will not need to consider the issue of trial competency.
80
However, regardless of whether forcible medication is actually authorized,
the analysis of alternative grounds will be helpful because the findings may
aid the court in its subsequent inquiry into the trial competence of a
particular defendant.'
173. Id. at 182. Here, Justice Breyer's argument is supported by the Harper Court, whose opinion
upheld the constitutionality of forcible medication of "a prison inmate who has a serious mental
illness ... if the inmate is dangerous to himself and others .. " Harper, 494 U.S. at 227.
174. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
175. Id. (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 140 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Justice Breyer lends further
support for this theory by stating that it may be easier for a psychiatrist or medical expert, knowing
the side effects associated with particular drugs, to assess whether those drugs are necessary to
control a defendant's potentially dangerous behavior, than to weigh the likelihood antipsychotics
could affect trial fairness or competence to stand trial. Id. Justice Breyer supports this contention
further by noting that, in the second scenario, a doctor would be attempting to analyze
"quintessentially legal questions." Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (citing ALA. CODE §§ 26-2A-102(a), 26-2A-105, 26-2A-108 ( 1992); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 13.26.105(a), 13.26.116(b) (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-5303, 14-5312 (West
1995); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-65-205, 28-65-301 (1987)).
179. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182.
180. Id. at 183.
181. Id. Justice Breyer poses various questions that may be answered by the preliminary inquiry
to support this notion of helpfulness. Id. Such questions include 1) why it would be medically
appropriate to forcibly medicate an individual who is neither dangerous nor incompetent to accept or
reject medical treatment, and 2) whether solely restoring trial competency will justify administration
of the drugs, despite harmful side effects associated with the drugs such as trial prejudice. Id.
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b. The Case at Hand: Given the New Standard, Should Sell be Forcibly
Medicated?
Before applying the new standard for forcible medication of
incompetent defendants for purposes of restoring trial competency, Justice
Breyer analyzed the standards utilized by the institution 182 and the magistrate
judge 183 in deciding Sell's case.' 84  Both the institution and the magistrate
appear to have used Sell's alleged dangerousness as the basis to approve
forcible medication. 185  However, because the district court concluded that
Sell was not dangerous, a finding later affirmed by the court of appeals, both
courts used trial competency as the sole basis for approving forcible
medication. 1
86
Assuming the court of appeals correctly found Sell non-dangerous, 87 it
erred in approving forced medication for the sole purpose of trial
competency for two reasons. 188 First, the magistrate judge approved forcible
medication because it was the "only way to render [Sell] not dangerous and
competent to stand trial," and not for trial competence purposes alone.
189
Justice Breyer believes that, because of these benefits of the preliminary inquiry, any court asked to
approve forcible medication of a defendant solely for trial competence purposes must determine
whether the government has already sought authorization of involuntary administration of the drugs
on these alternative grounds. Id.
182. See supra notes 103-111 and accompanying text.
183. See id.
184. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 183.
185. Id. Justice Breyer notes that these decisions were made using Harper as a guide. Id. Justice
Breyer probably drew this conclusion because a review of the hearings conducted both by the
institution staff and the magistrate, shows that in both instances the fact that Sell posed a danger to
himself and others was cited as a main reason for administering antipsychotics. Id.; see also supra
notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
186. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183; see also supra notes 109-116 and accompanying text (discussing the
district court and court of appeals holdings).
187. Justice Breyer assures that he only makes this assumption because the government did not
contest the court of appeals' finding that Sell was non-dangerous. Sell, 539 U.S. at 183. Justice
Breyer then criticized both the court of appeals' and the district court's opinions. Id. Despite the
fact that the court of appeals' found that an incident with a nurse was merely "inappropriate
familiarity," and consequently concluded that Sell was non-dangerous, the court failed to distinguish
how this type of behavior was different than that of someone not suffering from a mental illness. Id.;
see also supra note 100 and accompanying text (mentioning an incident in which Sell made
advances towards a nurse at the institution); United States v. Sell, 282 F.3d 560, 565 (8th Cir. 2002)
(finding "Sell's inappropriate behavior ... amounted at most to an 'inappropriate familiarity and
even infatuation' with a nurse"). The court of appeals also failed to explain why it concluded that
Sell's incident with the nurse should be minimized despite testimony from psychiatrists that Sell
was, in fact, dangerous. Sell, 539 U.S. at 184. Although the district court's opinion was more
thorough than the court of appeals' opinion, it still does not explain certain aspects leading up to the
finding that Sell is non-dangerous. Id. For example, it is not explained whether the institution's
return of Sell from isolation to the general prison population was a reflection of an improvement in
Sell's condition, nor is it clear whether the move was seen by the medical center staff as permanent
or temporary. Id.
188. Id. at 185.
189. Id. (citations omitted).
Second, it is clear from the record of the hearing held before the magistrate
that the experts participating in that hearing focused upon the issue of Sell's
dangerousness.' 90 As such, the experts failed to ask questions focused
around the issue of trial competence.' 91 Questions concerning the potential
side effects antipsychotics may have on a defendant are critical to an
analysis of trial competence analysis because of the tendency for these
effects to undermine the fairness of a trial. 192  Due to the failure of the
experts present at the hearing to pose such questions, the Court is unable to
determine if there was a likelihood that the drugs would cause Sell's trial to
be unfair.' 93
Finally, Justice Breyer attacked the lack of consideration the lower
courts gave to the length of Sell's past and potential future confinements at
the institution. 94 Sell's refusal to take the recommended medication may
result in further confinement for a lengthy period. 195  This is important to
consider in the decision to forcibly medicate because it reduces the chance
of Sell committing future crimes. 196  In addition, Sell has already spent
considerable time institutionalized, and thus he should receive credit for that
time towards any sentence he receives. 97  These factors lessen the
significance of the government's interest in trying the accused.
9 8
The above considerations led Justice Breyer to conclude that the court of
appeals' order permitting forcible administration of antipsychotic drugs was
190. Id.
191. Id. This is a weak argument. Justice Breyer suggests that, if the experts had focused on the
competence issue, they should have asked questions pertaining to "trial-related side effects and
risks." Id. However, the magistrate's findings from the hearing clearly note that "newer drugs
and/or changing drugs will 'ameliorat[e]' any 'serious side effects'. . . and that 'there is a substantial
probability' that the drugs will 'retur[nI' Sell 'to competency."' See id. at 173 (citations omitted).
192. See id. This argument is well supported. There is no shortage of data that links the side
effects of antipsychotics with an unfair trial. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (discussing trial-prejudicing side effects resulting from taking antipsychotics). Justice
Breyer also articulates his own list of side effects a defendant may suffer from the drugs: "[w]hether
a particular drug will tend to sedate a defendant, interfere with communication with counsel, prevent
rapid reaction to trial developments, or diminish the ability to express emotions." Sell, 539 U.S. at
185. Though Justice Breyer addresses the risks associated with undertaking treatment with
antipsychotics, he never addresses the risks associated with discontinuing the drugs. See infra note
221 and accompanying text.
193. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 185. This is a feeble contention by Justice Breyer. The Court blames
much of the fact that it is unable to determine whether the side effects of antipsychotics were likely
to cause prejudice in Sell's trial. Id. However, the Court never considers its ability to research the
particular drugs the institution sought to administer to Sell, and determine the known side effects that
drug may cause. See, e.g., Mossman, supra note 171, at 1066-84 (comparing the effects of old
antipsychotic drugs with effects of newer drugs and discussing the manner in which the newer drugs
affect the first-time user's body); Siegel, supra note 10, at 348-50 (elaborating on the risks and
benefits of novel antipsychotics such as Clozapine, Risperidone, Olanzapine, Quetiapine, and
Ziprasidone).
194. Sell, 539 U.S. at 186.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b)).
198. Id.; see id at 179-84.
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issued in error.' 99 Thus, Justice Breyer vacated the judgment and remanded
the case.2°
B. Justice Scalia's Dissent
1. The Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Hear Sell's Case Because the
District Court's Order Did Not Fall Within the Exception to the Final
Judgment Rule
Although he wrote the dissenting opinion for Sell,20 1 Justice Scalia never
expressed a view on the issue of forcible medication itself.20 2  Instead,
Justice Scalia attacked the Court's jurisdiction over the case, claiming that
because the district court's pretrial forced medication was not immediately
appealable, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.20 3
Before addressing the issue of the jurisdiction, Justice Scalia briefly
reviewed Sell's case and the journey taken by the order for forcible
medication before reaching the Supreme Court.2° 4  Both Sell and the
government contend that courts of appeals are statutorily permitted to review
199. Id. at 186. Justice Breyer did state that the government may continue its quest for forcible
medication, based on the newly established standard, or based on Sell's alleged dangerousness. Id.
200. Id.
201. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas in his dissent.
202. Sell, 539 U.S. at 186-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 186-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the analysis used by Justice Breyer in
reaching the conclusion that the Court had jurisdiction to hear Sell's case). As support for his
opinion that Sell's case is not appealable, Justice Scalia cites to other cases concerning pretrial
orders permitting forcible medication which were not appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 258-59 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Brandon, 158 F.3d 947, 950-51 (6th Cir. 1998). In addition to criticizing Justice Breyer's opinion,
Justice Scalia also "admonish[ed] the Eighth Circuit [Court of Appeals] for failing even 'to wonder
whether it had any business entertaining [Sell's] appeal."' The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading
Cases, 117 HARv. L. REv. 307, 312 (2003) (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 186).
204. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 186-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia repeated the chain of
events leading to the Supreme Court's review of Sell's case. Id. Beginning with the magistrate's
order that Sell was incompetent to stand trial, Justice Scalia noted that this decision was based on
Sell's inability to "understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him" or to
assist counsel to prepare his defense. Id. at 187. The magistrate then ordered that Sell be
institutionalized to determine whether there was a substantial likelihood of his competence returning
in the near future. Id. Thereafter, a psychiatrist opined that Sell should take antipsychotics in order
to render him competent for trial purposes. Id. Sell's appeal of the psychiatrist's recommendation
was denied, thereby leaving the government with the authority to forcibly medicate. Id. Sell then
submitted a motion to the district court, seeking a hearing concerning the medication. Id. at 188. A
magistrate granted Sell's motion, held a hearing, and subsequently granted the government's order
permitting involuntary medication of Sell. Id. The district court later approved this order. Id. Sell
then appealed to the court of appeals. Id. Justice Scalia also mentioned that the magistrate's
subsequent order approving the government's order to medicate was probably unnecessary because
the government already had statutory authorization to medicate Sell by means of the unappealed
administrative decision. See id. at n.3 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 549.43 (2003)).; see Steel Co. v. Citizens
for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
"all final decisions of the district courts of the United States."2 °5 There is an
exception to the this "statutory command," called the "collateral-order"
doctrine, which allows courts of appeals to review district court orders that
(1) "conclusively determine the disputed question," (2) "resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," and (3)
are "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. ''20 6  The
district court's order permitting forcible medication does not satisfy the third
207prong of the exception.
Riggins v. Nevada2 8 may be used to support the reasoning that the
district court's order "is reviewable on appeal from conviction," but not
immediately appealable as a collateral-order. 2 9 Riggins was involuntarily
medicated as a pretrial detainee.210 After receiving his conviction for
murder, he appealed, claiming that forcible medication violated the due
process standards articulated in Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990).' The Riggins Court found that involuntary administration of
antipsychotics to a criminal defendant without compliance with the Harper
standards creates a risk of an unfair trial.212 Thus, the defendant's conviction
is automatically vacated.21 3  As such, Justice Breyer was incorrect in his
conclusion that an ordinary appeal, meaning one that is brought after a
conviction and sentence are entered, is brought too late to enforce the
defendant's right to refuse involuntary medication.1
205. Sell, 539 U.S. at 188-89 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1993)) (emphasis in original). Justice
Scalia refers to this rule as the "final judgment rule," which excludes appellate review of orders in
criminal cases until the defendant has been convicted and a sentence imposed. Id. (citing Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-57 (1977)).
206. Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). Justice Scalia draws
attention to the fact that this exception is "invented," as there is no statutory basis for it. Id.
207. Id.
208. 504 U.S. 127 (1992)
209. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 189.
210. Id.
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id. (citing Id. at 177). This argument is flawed. While the Riggins court found that
involuntary medication administered without the proper due process measures was unconstitutional,
which warranted automatic vacatur of Riggins' conviction, Riggins was nonetheless already
medicated against his will. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 130-32 (1992). Thus, Riggins
seems to stand more for the principle that a defendant who has already undergone medication should
not incur harm from an unfair trial. Id. at 133-38. However, Justice Breyer seeks to protect Sell
from forcible medication in the first place. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 176-77. Justice Breyer does not
view an appeal of the pretrial order, once Sell has already been medicated, as a means of vindication.
See id. Rather, Justice Breyer seeks to prevent medication at all: the actual ingestion of the
medication itself being the harm. See id. Permitting Sell to be medicated against his will, and then
subsequently declaring the order unconstitutional, does not effectively protect Sell from that specific
harm. Id. Justice Scalia also notes that the majority's statement that the order to forcibly medicate
will be unreviewable if Sell is acquitted does not justify the third prong of the collateral-order
doctrine. Id. at 190 n.5. To be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment" does not
equate with the "possibility that the aggrieved party will have no occasion to appeal." Id. (quoting
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). It should also be noted, however, that
Justice Breyer did not use such reasoning, namely the possibility of Sell's acquittal, as a means to
satisfy the third prong of the collateral-order exception. Id. at 176. Justice Breyer was merely
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Though it is true that an appeal after conviction would not provide Sell
with the desired remedy,1 5 this reasoning is not the basis for permitting an
interlocutory appeal.21 6  The collateral-order exception is construed very
strictly in criminal cases. 217 In the fifty-four years since the exception has
been recognized by the Court,218 only three types of pretrial orders have been
found to be appealable in criminal cases: "denials of motions to reduce
bail, '219 "denials of motions to dismiss on double-jeopardy grounds," 2 ° and
"denials of motions to dismiss under the Speech or Debate Clause."
221
Justification for the first exception may be found in the fact that a denial of a
motion to lower the amount of bail becomes moot if the defendant is forced
to wait until after conviction to appeal.222 Riggins demonstrates that the
scenario at hand is not comparable to the situation involving a denial of a
motion to reduce bail.223 The latter two exceptions to the final judgment rule
emphasizing the point that the harm caused by permitting the order for forcible medication to be
carried out could not be undone. See id. at 176-7.7. If Sell was declared competent and tried,
regardless of whether he later appealed after a conviction was entered or was later acquitted, the
damage done to his body by the drugs could not be reversed. Id. Thus, the example of an acquittal
was merely another means of showing the permanence of the effects of the antipsychotics. See id.
215. See id. at 190. Justice Scalia contrasts the preferred remedy, "a predeprivation injunction"
with the remedy he would receive if his appeal was delayed, "[a] postdeprivation vacatur of
conviction." Id. (noting that the second remedy is that which was received by Riggins). Here,
Justice Scalia reiterates exactly what Justice Breyer already articulated: that the type of remedy Sell
would receive would not vindicate the type of harm that he is seeking to avoid. See id. at 177. Thus,
it seems logical that, because Sell is seeking to protect a different type of harm than was protected in
Riggins, he should not receive the same type of remedy as Riggins, despite Justice Scalia's
contention.
216. Justice Scalia provides support for this notion, that an appellant's failure to receive the
specific remedy preferred if forced to wait to appeal after a "final judgment" does not permit early
appeal of an order, is supported by past case law. See id. at 190 (citing Flanagan v. United States,
465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984) (refusing to permit interlocutory appeal of an order that disqualified
defendant's counsel); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263 (1982) (per curiam)
(refusing to permit interlocutory appeal of an order that denied a motion to dismiss an indictment for
purposes of prosecutorial vindictiveness); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957) (refusing to
permit interlocutory appeal of an order which denied a motion to suppress evidence)).
217. Sell, 539 U.S. at 190 (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799
(1989)).
218. Id. (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949)).
219. Id. (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)). It is interesting to note that, in a concurring
opinion in Stack, Justice Jackson notes one of the justifications for reviewing an order fixing bail is
that "unless [the order] can be reviewed before sentence, it can never be reviewed at all." Stack, 342
U.S. at 12 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This is similar logic to that used
by Justice Breyer: if the order to forcibly medicate Sell is not reviewed before he is actually
medicated for trial, then later review of the order is presumably ineffective. See Sell, 539 U.S. at
177.
220. Id. at 190 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656-57
(1977)).
221. Id. (citing Helstonski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, (1979)).
222. Id. at 190-91 (citing Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 266 (1984)); see also supra
note 209-11 and accompanying text
(noting that this logic is similar to that employed by Justice Breyer in the Majority opinion).
223. Id. at 191.
are justified "on the ground that it was appropriate to interrupt the trial when
the precise right asserted was the right not to be tried. '224 These exceptions
are also inapplicable to Sell because he has asserted a right to refuse
medication, not the right to not be tried.2z
The majority's holding will permit other defendants in Sell's position to
engage in "opportunistic behavior," such as taking antipsychotics until a trial
is halfway over, then refusing to continue the medication and demand
immediate appeal from an order permitting medication to continue on a
compulsory basis. 226  The majority did not discuss concern for this sort of
disruption of criminal trials, yet this is the very reason for the Court's past
narrow interpretation of the collateral-order doctrine in all prior criminal
cases.
227
The effects on criminal proceedings from the Court's holding are small
compared to the adverse effects of the new rule underlying the Court's
holding concerning appellate jurisdiction. 28 The analysis used by the Court
in finding appellate review appropriate, namely that because an appeal after
Sell has already undergone forced medication will subject him to, rather than
protect him from, the harm he seeks to avoid, "effects a breathtaking
expansion of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders., 229  The
Court's logic permits other courts applying similar reasoning to find that any
criminal defendant claiming that a trial court order violates a particular
constitutional right is entitled to an immediate appeal.230  The majority's
224. Id. (citing Abney, 431 U.S. at 660-61; Helstonski, 442 U.S. at 507-08).
225. Id.
226. Id. While Justice Breyer did not mention the risks of discontinuing medication, Justice
Scalia mentions the issue here, but does not delve into it. See id. at 177-86 (failing to discuss the
risks of discontinuing antipsychotics). Just as beginning treatment with antipsychotics may lead to
severe side effects, the risks of discontinuing treatment may also be harsh. See Siegel, supra note
10, at 350-52. There is medical concern that discontinuing antipsychotic drugs may cause
irreparable harm. Id. at 351. Medical studies provide evidence that patients whose psychotropic
drugs have been discontinued may incur relapses. Id. It may also be difficult for those individuals
to return to their prior level of functioning. Id. While some patients may benefit from discontinuing
the drugs, having their previous symptoms of mental illness disappear for an unpredictable period of
time, others may develop new symptoms, symptoms that are different from those they had at the
time they committed the offense they are charged with. Id.
227. Sell, 539 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States,
489 U.S. 794,799 (1989); Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264 (1984)).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. Justice Scalia cautions that this type of scenario may cause trial delays for months. Id.
Some examples of the defendant's ability to immediately appeal on a claim of a violation of rights
that would not be vindicated if appeal was impermissible until after a final judgment include an
order "requiring the defendant to wear an electronic bracelet [which] could be attacked as an
immediate infringement of the constitutional right to 'bodily integrity."' Id. at 192. Likewise, a trial
court order "refusing to allow the defendant to wear a T-shirt that says 'Black Power' in front of the
jury could be attacked as an immediate violation of First Amendment rights; and an order
compelling testimony could be attacked as an immediate denial [of] Fifth Amendment rights." Id.
In his opinion, Justice Breyer made a feeble attempt to refute this argument, claiming that "the
severity of the intrusion and corresponding importance of the constitutional issue" made Sell's case
distinguishable from such examples. Id.; see supra note 135 (discussing why Justice Breyer's
argument does not completely differentiate Sell's case from Justice Scalia's examples).
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holding also effectively overrules Flanagan231 and Carroll,32 which held
that orders potentially infringing upon a defendant's constitutional rights
could nevertheless only be appealed after a final judgment. 33
Essentially, Justice Breyer's opinion seems to covertly revise the three-
prong test for a collateral-order exception since the majority has not met the
third requirement,234 yet it still permitted appeal of the district court's
order.235 The majority supported its decision by differentiating Sell's case
from others: immediate appeal was permissible for Sell because the intrusion
caused by forcible medication is severe, and the constitutional issue at stake
is important. 6 This statement "must mean that [the Court] is revising the
Cohen test, to dispense with the third requirement... only when the
important separate issue in question involves a 'severe intrusion' and hence
an 'important constitutional issue. -237
Sell could have used a variety of other methods in order to obtain
immediate review of the district court's order before his trial.238 However,
because Sell chose to oppose the order to be forcibly medicated during a
criminal trial, he should have to bear the restraints placed on such
challenges, and thus his proceedings should not have been delayed.2 39 The
Court's desire to hear Sell's case and issue a decision on the issue of forcible
medication for trial competency purposes should not have persuaded the
Court to disregard statutory limitations on appellate jurisdictions. 24  As
such, the judgment of the Court should be vacated, and the case remanded to
the court of appeals for dismissal.24'
231. Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
232. Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1957).
233. Sell, 539 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
234. The third requirement is "being unreviewable on appeal." Id.; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
235. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 192, 177.
237. Id. at 192. Though Justice Scalia praises such narrowing of the Court's revision, he also
opposes any revision of the three-prong test because there is no basis for the revision in prior
opinions and because it provides an opportunity for criminal defendants to take advantage of it to
avoid trial. Id. at 192-93; see supra note 213 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia admonishes the
Court again, noting that if he were changing the Cohen requirements, he would "at least do so in an
undisguised fashion." Sell, 539 U.S. at 193 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id. (noting that, as a pretrial detainee challenging conditions of his confinement, filing a
claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. or an action under Bivens v.
Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) could have earned Sell immediate appeal
of a denial of relief).
239. See id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
V. IMPACT
A. Judicial
1. Justice Scalia Predicts that the Court's Approval of Immediate
Appeal of the District Court's Order Will Widen "The [N]arrow
[G]ate of [E]ntry to the [C]ollateral-order [D]octrine ' 24
2
Sell leaves much uncertainty regarding the permissibility of immediate
review of pre-trial orders by courts of appeals in criminal cases.243 Justice
Scalia predicts that the Court's holding will greatly increase the number of
pretrial orders that appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear, thereby causing
a large number of criminal proceedings to be interrupted.2 " Justice Breyer
believes that although appellate review by the court of appeals was
necessary in this particular case because of the circumstances surrounding it,
future effects of the Court's opinion will be minimized for that very reason:
the distinctive nature of Sell's case.245 Specifically, Sell's holding threatens
to upset the timeliness of criminal proceedings and the requirements of the
collateral-order doctrine.
a. Effect on the Court: Cause for Uncertainty
If interpreted broadly, the Sell decision could potentially cause
disruption of every criminal trial in which the defendant makes a claim for a
violation of a constitutional right.246 Nonetheless, if the decision is read
narrowly, as Justice Breyer encouraged, only orders involving "severe"
intrusions into a defendant's privacy and important constitutional issues
shall be considered appropriate for appeal.247 Nevertheless, since Justice
Breyer did not fully define what these terms mean, or why they make an
order for forcible medication unique, they are open for wide
interpretation.248
In Harper, Justice Stevens described the liberty interest in one's body as
both "physical and intellectual," stemming from a person's right to privacy
and providing a means for the government to essentially control a medicated
242. Id. at 192.
243. See id.; see generally The Supreme Court, 2002 Term Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV.
307 (2003) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (discussing the effects of Sell on the collateral-order
doctrine).
244. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 176 (noting that in Sell, appellate review of the district court's order was justified by
satisfaction of the collateral-order doctrine, the severity of the intrusion caused by forcible
medication and the importance of the constitutional right at stake).
246. Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 176.
248. See id.; Leading Cases, supra note 244, at 313.
[Vol. 32: 727, 2005] Sell v. United States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
defendant's mind.249  However, this opinion still failed to explain the
individuality of the right to refuse antipsychotic drugs.250 Justice Breyer
failed to establish the uniqueness of the right any further, or define it in any
more precise terms. 21  Thus, without establishment of any restrictions
regarding what cases satisfy Justice Breyer's standard of exclusivity, it
appears that many claims of an intrusion into a liberty interest may satisfy
the standard.252
In addition to adding uncertainty regarding the types of intrusions and
constitutional rights that may warrant appellate review, the Court's decision
has created confusion around the well-settled exception to the "final
judgment" rule.253 Prior to Sell, the Supreme Court had articulated only
three exceptions that satisfied the three-prong collateral-order exception in
the criminal arena. 4  However, Sell has established a fourth exception:
pretrial orders approving involuntary medication are subject to appeal prior
to a conviction or sentencing. 255 The Court's reasoning for permitting this
fourth exception may open up a proverbial can of worms.
Prior to the Sell Court's holding, the third element of the collateral-order
exception, "effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment,"
could not be satisfied on the basis that ordinary appeal would come too late
for the preferred remedy.256 However, now courts may consider the effect of
an ordinary post-judgment appeal upon the defendant to find whether the
third prong has been satisfied.257 Under Sell, any time a court believes that a
post-trial appeal would come too late to avoid the alleged harm, the court
may find that the third requirement has been satisfied, and thus that appellate
249. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Leading Cases, supra note 243, at 313.
250. See Leading Cases, supra note 243, at 312.
251. Id.; Sell, 539 U.S. at 175-86.
252. See id. at 191-92 (accusing the Court's ruling of causing "uncertainty," and thus, Justice
Scalia would not have adopted such a holding). One suggestion for how the Court could have
avoided such confusion, and such a multiplicity of claims that would satisfy Sell's standard would be
to "develop[] a substantive theory of the due process violation that forced medication may effect."
Leading Cases, supra note 243, at 314. By stipulating "that the collateral order doctrine would
extend jurisdiction only if an appellant asserted a liberty interest of [refusal of unwanted medical
treatment]," the Court could have therefore eliminated a great number of potential appeals. Id.
253. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 187-91 (Scalia, I., dissenting).
254. Id. at 190; Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979);
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
255. Id. at 176-77.
256. Id. at 190 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This point is well established by precedent. See Flanagan
v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (finding an order disqualifying defense counsel must be
appealed after conviction or sentencing); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 263
(1982) (per curiam) (holding that an order denying motion to dismiss for prosecutorial
vindictiveness must be appealed after conviction or sentencing); Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S.
394 (1957) (concluding that an order denying a motion to suppress evidence must be appealed after
conviction or sentencing).
257. See Leading Cases, supra note 244, at 312-13.
jurisdiction exists .258 Because the Court failed to clarify exactly which cases
this new standard may apply to, Justice Scalia's prediction, stating that the
Court's decision has prompted a massive expansion of the collateral-order
doctrine as it is currently known, will likely come true.259
b. Effects on the Defendants:
This type of uncertainty within the Court itself may effectively create an
"opportunity for gamesmanship" amongst the defendants whose rights are at
stake.26  Under Sell, a defendant who seeks to avoid or delay trial may
easily do so. All the defendant must do is claim that a pretrial order, if
carried out, will result in a privacy intrusion and support the argument with a
constitutional right that protects that liberty.26' The Court's failure to limit
these instances solely to a Sell-type of case has thus not only affected the
Court, but those accused as well. Consequently, a defendant who
voluntarily takes his medication until halfway through trial, and then decides
to stop, could immediately appeal a trial order forcing him to continue his
262thmedication. As such, the Court's holding may cause great disruption and
delay of criminal trials of mentally ill defendants.263
2. The Court's Holding Will Affect the Future of Permissible
Involuntary Treatment with Antipsychotics for Trial Competency
Purposes
a. Effects on the Government's Burden of Proof and Right to Override
a Defendant's Liberty Interest
Prior to Sell, no explicit standard existed for judges to follow in
determining whether forcible medication for trial competency purposes
alone was justified. 264  However, Sell has established four stringent
conditions that the government must satisfy before an order permitting
forcible medication to restore a defendant's competency for trial will be
258. Id.
259. Sell, 539 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting). One way in which the Court could have avoided
such problems would have been to distinguish Sell's case on the basis of a factor other than
timeliness. Rather than view Sell's appeal as subject to immediate review because otherwise the
harm sought to be avoided would actually be incurred, the court could have viewed "Sell's appeal
from the collateral order [as] dispositive of whether any trial would ensue." See Leading Cases,
supra note 243, at 316. "The same could not generally be said of defendants who, according to
Justice Scalia's examples, appeal from orders regarding electronic bracelets, courtroom attire, or
compelled testimony." Id. (citing Sell, 539 U.S. at 191-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
260. Sell, 539 U.S. at 192-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
261. Id.; see Leading Cases, supra note 243, at 312.
262. Sell, 539 U.S. at 191 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
263. Id.
264. See Robert B. Bluey, Supreme Court Makes It Tougher to Forcibly Drug Inmates, June 17,
2003, available at http://www.cnsnews.com/Nation/Archive/200306/NAT20030617b.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005) (quoting an attorney supporting Sell's right to refuse medication).
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granted.265 These requirements will likely discourage the government from
seeking orders for forcible medication, thereby lessening the number of
defendants who will be involuntarily medicated in the future.266
Because of this heavier burden, the Sell decision may also increase the
number of civil proceedings that are filed in search of an order for forcible
medication.267 Critiqued as a sign for prosecutors to consider seeking
alternatives to forcible medication through a court order, Sell may lead the
government to pursue the civil procedural model of involuntary
medication.268 The "civil procedure usually involves the appointment of a
guardian with the' power to make medical decisions for patients who may
lack the mental competence to do so. ' '269 Once appointed, the guardian may
authorize medication of a defendant, if the guardian feels administration of
the drugs are in the defendant's best interests. 270 Thus, discouraged by the
stringent four-factor test in Sell, a prosecutor seeking to try an incompetent
criminal defendant may prefer to have a guardian with decision-making
authority appointed for the criminal defendant, rather than to seek an order
approving forcible medication from the court itself.
27 1
Despite the notion that Sell effectively weakens the position of the
government, the decision has also been viewed as recognition of greater
governmental power. 272 "The decision... could give weight to what appears
to be an expanding notion that [the] government can override the
constitutional liberty of individuals on medical matters.2 73 As such, the Sell
decision may actually encourage the government to file an increasing
number of claims, seeking court-ordered approval of forcible medication in a
variety of scenarios.
These implications demonstrate the powerful effects Sell will have on
the position of the government, the party seeking to involuntarily medicate
265. Id.; Sell, 539 U.S. at 180-81.
266. See Bluey, supra note 264. The U.S. Justice Department reports that out of the 285
defendants held to be mentally incompetent to stand trial, 80% of them voluntarily took
antipsychotic medication to treat their illnesses. Supreme Court Allows Defendant's Forced
Medications, REUTERS, June 16, 2003, available at http://12.42.224.225/HealthNewslreuters/
NewsStory06l6200326.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (quoting the U.S. Justice Department). This
leaves fifty-nine defendants who were treated involuntarily, many of whom did not seek judicial
review of the orders to forcibly medicate. Id.
267. See David L. Hudson Jr., Rules Tightened On Forcibly Medicating Defendants: High Court
Offers Guidelines on Involuntary Medication for Competency, 2 A.B.A. J. EREPORT 24 (2003).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See Drugging Defendants: Supreme Court Sets Limits, But is that Enough?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, June 18, 2003, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0618/p08s03-
comv.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
273. Id.
individuals. Likewise, the Sell decision will have a severe impact on those
persons seeking to avoid forcible medication.
b. Effects on Mentally Ill Defendants
Sell's holding will reach beyond the courtroom and the government,
giving far more weight to the rights of criminal defendants awaiting trial.
Sell recognizes the "important role that a defendant himself plays in his own
trial and the contributions he makes to his lawyer and his own defense.,
274
In addition to the significance of the role in one's trial, to some Sell is a
"symbol of clinging to personal autonomy in the face of overweening
government power.,
275
Sell has also been viewed by medical ethicists as acknowledgment of
involuntary medication of non-violent defendants as a form of censorship. 76
As such, Sell effectively recognizes a defendant's right to control his own
277
cognitive processes.
Despite the seemingly positive effects of Sell, Justice Breyer's opinion
may also have ramifications on mentally ill defendants awaiting trial. The
scenario involving forcible medication leaves the government looking out
for the defendants' medical interests, while the defendants' attorneys seek to
protect the defendants' right to continue their existence in a delusional
state.278 Thus, though essentially recognizing greater rights for mentally ill
defendants, Sell actually permits defendants to remain in a sickened,
unmedicated state, thereby making the alleged benefits earned by the
decision questionable.279
B. Social Impact
1. Effects on Members of the General Public Suffering from Mental
Illnesses
Despite the fact that Sell's holding seems to have implications only upon
mentally ill defendants, the decision will impact the mentally ill nationwide,
beyond the legal setting. "Inside and outside prisons, many people who
cannot be deemed imminently dangerous nevertheless desperately need
274. Hudson, supra note 267; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Restrict Forced Medication
Preceding A Trial, THE NEW YORK TiMES, June 17, 2003, at A6 (noting the widespread under
appreciation of the right of the defendant to be functional at his own trial).
275. Greenhouse, supra note 274.
276. Bill Mears, Supreme Court Limits Forced Medication of Non-violent Defendants, June 26
2003, available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/06/16/scotus.forced.medication/ (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005).
277. See id.; but see Lypps, supra note 152 (finding that Justice Breyer's opinion failed to address
Sell's First Amendment right of freedom of thought).
278. When To Drug A Prisoner, THE WASH. POST, June 17, 2003, at A20, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A2818-2003Junl6?language=printer (last visited Feb. 3,
2005).
279. See id.
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medication or hospitalization they refuse., 280 Although Sell recognizes the
risk of court-ordered forcible medication becoming too easy for the
government to attain for those in jail, there may also be problems with
making the receipt of medical treatment extremely complicated for the
mentally ill living outside of prisons. Many state laws make it too
difficult to ensure that the mentally ill, whose symptoms impair their
judgment so that they do not even realize that they need help, will even
receive treatment.282 As such, courts devise alternative theories to justify
unwanted treatment, reasons that support treatment in order to serve
283society's interests rather than those of the patients. The mentally ill
"should be treated not for utilitarian reasons but because it is inhumane not
to help them. ' '284
2. Effects on Society at Large
Sell has the potential to affect the general public's view of the mentally
ill. Rather than focusing on the Sell decision as establishment of greater
autonomy for individuals, our society as a whole may focus upon the
government's position in Sell's case, which lends itself to the potential for
negative connotation of the opinion. "[T]he decision... raises a small
caution flag for a society that, to its detriment, turns more and more often to
drugs to solve its problems.' '285
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Sell v. United States286 presents a
variety of impacts on many areas of the law and society. At first glance, Sell
seemingly provides clarity within the court system for the previously hazy
standard in cases seeking to forcibly medicate non-violent, mentally ill
defendants to render them competent to be tried. However, the Supreme
Court's holding has created confusion both in and out of the courtroom.
Though the case contributes to the body of law permitting a court to take
away a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the case may also be
viewed as standing for the seemingly contradictory recognition of greater
rights for the mentally ill. Further perplexing is Sell's effect on the
280. Id.
281. Id. There is the potential risk to those mentally ill living in general society that if forcible
medication is easily obtained, those "capable of living productively in their communities without
harming anyone get locked up." Id.
282. Id.
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. Drugging Defendants, supra note 272.
286. 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
possibility that a court may be able to forcibly administer drugs to
individuals in other scenarios. For instance, will Sell enable the government
to force a child to take Ritalin in order to attend school? Finally, confusion
surrounding the procedural impact of Sell remains to be seen. The
predictions concerning the onslaught of trial interruptions will be proven
true or false once courts begin to interpret the alleged widening of the
collateral-order doctrine.
The substantive impacts of Sell will best be measured over time, as
future cases concerning the rights of the mentally ill surface before the court.
In this struggle between the rights of the mentally ill and a state's right to try
the criminally accused, the weight of the Sell decision will only truly be seen
as similar scenarios surface, involving different drugs and different illnesses,
but where the same right remains at stake: the right of an individual to make
autonomous decisions about the body.
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